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ACDA review(s) completed.

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Date: April 7, 1960

Time: Dinner, 8:00 p.m.

Place: Hotel des Bergues

UNITED STATES DELEGATION
to the
CONFERENCE OF THE TEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
Geneva, Switzerland March 15, 1960

Participants: Ambassador Fredrick M. Eaton - US Delegation
Mr. Alexander Akalovsky - US Delegation

Deputy Foreign Minister Valerin Zorin - USSR Delegation
Mr. Yuri Vinogradov - USSR Delegation

Copies to: U.S. Delegation
C/AL (50)
American Embassies:
Paris, Rome, Ottawa, Moscow,
London, Utsu

Most of the conversation before and during dinner consisted of exchanges of pleasantries, but toward the end of the dinner Zorin raised the question of the recess, asking Eaton whether the period between April 29 and June 6 was to be considered as agreed. He said that the Summit might last up to ten days and that about ten days would be required to digest its conclusions. When Eaton told him any day the first week in June would be acceptable as reconvening date, Zorin checked the calendar and said that perhaps it would be better to reconvene on the 7th, which would be on a Tuesday so as to have Monday open for possible private discussions on questions of procedure. Eaton said this would be acceptable to him and raised the question of how this might be handled with regard to the press. After a brief discussion, it was agreed that the only official announcement

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would be at the end of the last meeting before the recess, but that each delegation would informally inform the press of the planned recess. Eaton said that he was happy that procedural questions at the beginning of the Conference had been resolved quickly and to everyone's satisfaction and that he did not intend to make an issue of procedural questions, since substance was what counted. Zorin replied that he also believed that procedural issues should not hamper our work, but stated that in this connection he wanted to mention a point which had arisen with regard to the language suggested by Ormsby-Gore for a communique about the publication of verbatim records. He said that he did not believe that it would be wise to have a reference in the communique to the effect that publication of verbatim records would be subject to unanimous agreement in each case, because this could give rise to speculation as to possible objections on the part of some Conference participants. It was clear that any agreement reached by the Conference would stand so long as there was no objection by anyone. He also said that he did not feel that it would be wise to specify the time of release of documents for the preceding month because there may be cases, such as in May, where it would be preferable to release the documents at a time other than at the end of the month. Eaton replied that he was not familiar with the language suggested by Ormsby-Gore and that he was not aware of the problems involved, but that, subject to his Government's views, he personally felt that there would be no objection to Mr. Zorin's suggestion.

Eaton then said that he intended to keep private conversations, such as this one, in strict confidence and that if he made any statements which he intended to make public afterwards, he would advise Zorin of such intention. However, he would advise his Government and his Western partners of any possible private discussions he might have with Zorin. He expressed the hope that Zorin would reciprocate in this respect. Zorin inferred that he would do so, because otherwise there would be no point in having private discussions.

Zorin then asked Eaton about his views as to the future work of the Conference and what could be done to prepare something for the Summit. He said it would be a shame if the Conference were to come to the Summit empty-handed. Eaton replied that, after today's statement by Zorin in the plenary meeting, he was at a loss as to what the Conference could do between

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now and the Summit. He said that he felt that the positions of the two sides should be brought much more closely together than they were now if anything constructive was to be produced; obviously this would require much more time than there was left until the Summit. He hoped, however, that both the USSR and the US could find an area which would be in their interest from the standpoint of their respective security and that they would produce something constructive, perhaps as a result of discussions such as this one. He said that the US approached these negotiations in the belief that the Soviet Union was interested in a degree of disarmament -- what degree and for what reason, we could not tell -- and that he hoped that the Soviet Union realized that the United States also was interested in a degree of disarmament. Therefore, the two sides should try to find common ground on certain specific areas which could lay the ground for future progress toward our ultimate goal.

Zorin replied that he agreed that the time remaining until the Summit was very short and, citing the example of the Nuclear Tests Conference, stated that it would be impossible to work out an agreement on any specific measure because that would require thorough discussion of many technical details. He did feel, however, that it would be much easier to agree in this period left before the Summit on a set of principles which, if endorsed by the Summit, could serve as directive for our future work after the Summit. He also felt that Heads of State could not agree on any specific measure because again such agreement would require detailed discussions; what they could do was to agree on a set of general principles with a view to having them developed and spelled out in detail by the Conference.

Eaton stated that if Zorin had in mind a list of what he would call end-products, such as "Ban the Bomb," "Liquidate the Bases," "Abolish All Nuclear Establishments," etc., that would not be acceptable because we could not agree to any of these things without a prior discussion and agreement on the means for verification of such measures. Zorin replied that he had raised this point privately with other Western delegates and that no one could produce a valid argument against this approach; only Mr. Moch, who seemed to object to this approach even more strongly than

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his other Western colleagues, said that the principles would commit the Western powers to a set of measures. Yet even this argument held no water because the question was not of signing a document or commitment; but what was involved was simply a statement of principles elaborated on the basis of the general formula contained in the UN Resolution. In other words, this general formula would be developed and elaborated so as to give a rough sketch of the total picture of general and complete disarmament. As to any possibility of discussing individual, specific measures at this time, Mr. Zorin said that he had no instruction to engage in such discussion at this stage of negotiations and that the Soviet Union would not be prepared to do so until and unless this rough sketch of the general program was agreed on. However, if such a set of principles were agreed upon by the Conference and endorsed by the Summit, the Soviet Union would be prepared to set down and spell out the first stages in more detail than the last one, because "frankly speaking" it was difficult to foresee when the last stage would take place. Eaton reiterated that it depended upon what Zorin had in mind when he spoke of general plans; if he was thinking of a list of "end products," that would be unacceptable; but if he had in mind a very broad general language expressing the desirability of bringing about a disarmed world where freedom from fear of war would reign, etc., that perhaps could be worked out, but again this was his personal opinion and subject to instructions from his Government. He then suggested that perhaps all subjects for discussion had been exhausted and that both Mr. Zorin and he should think about what had been said and see each other again in a few days. Mr. Zorin agreed, but in parting stated that he wanted to make it very clear that if and when the Soviet delegation introduced something in the Conference this would not mean that every single word or comma would have to remain unchanged and would not be subject to modification.

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